The Strike: Interrupting Power
Electricity workers’ rally, Khartoum, Sudan. 5 September 2022. (Photo courtesy of TAM on Facebook).
In the Sudanese capital, Khartoum, urban infrastructure has been offering a space for expressions of political subjectivities since the ousting of the dictatorship of Al Bashir in 2019. With the overthrow of the repressive military state, the heterogeneous groups of city dwellers have been grappling with ways to make their voices heard. This was expressed in the formation and consolidation of professional bodies, labour and trade unions, demand-based groups, and most importantly, neighbourhood-based resistance committees. The importance of these committees stem from their decentralised, yet coordinated city-wide mobilisation which managed to defy successive attempts to crush the revolutionary movement that culminated in the October 2021 military coup-d’etat.
Infrastructure as a space of power struggle has been addressed by different scholars and from diverse perspectives. Von Schnitzler characterises infrastructure as a location of varying “forms of political subjectivity”.[1] She emphasises the ways political actions are “embedded within technical forms” and how technical forms shape the “political question”.
Electricity, and energy infrastructure in general, as vehicles of power, have been usefully addressed in Boyer’s concept of “energopower”.[2] Boyer proposes the concept of “energopower” to convey the historical specificity where modern political power is expressed in the “twin analytics of electricity and fuel” as ubiquitous “modalities of biopower”. He argues that concepts of energopower and energopolitics express the “increasing recognition that conditions of life today are increasingly and unstably intertwined with particular infrastructures, magnitudes, and habits of using electricity.”[3]
Moreover, allocation of urban infrastructures reflects the existing power structures along with the institutional, social and political frames that define the embedded inequality of access.[4] This becomes even more pronounced in contexts like Khartoum’s, where a highly underserved population lives with unreliable or lacking complete access to public services of electricity, water, sanitation, paved roads and so on.[5] The situation is further exacerbated by the exponential city growth, home to 9 million people, or 20% of the country’s population,[6] with the majority being displaced by conflicts or for economic in-migration towards the hub of economic, social and political power. Khartoum also hosts more than one million refugees from neighbouring countries.[7]
Such massive exodus towards the city were not matched by a proportional expansion in city planning or infrastructures. This was a result of a combination of the mismanagement of successive post-colonial governments, the lack of financial resources following the secession of South Sudan in 2011, and the loss of substantial oil revenues.[8] Access to such limited infrastructural resources has been increasingly questioned and contested in different forms and by different actors in the past few years.
The multiplicity of these emerging political expressions is traced in this essay; reflecting on the strike events of the electricity sector employees of autumn 2022, and the ways city dwellers reacted to such disruptive events. Examining these disruptive actions provides a magnified look into the organisational forms and tactics mobilised from below, to challenge the de facto authorities of the coup and the impoverishing practices of postcolonial regimes. The first part of the essay addresses the development of the strike led by the “Electricity Workers Salary Committee” and the context within which this event of supply interruption developed and unfolded. The second part is a more personal account of a series of encounters with the city residents as receivers of power supply during the two waves of the strike.
Interrupting power supply
The electricity sector has been in an unstable situation for years. Only around 32% of the Sudanese population have access to the national grid, while lengthy and daily blackouts have become the norm for grid-connected residents, interrupting almost every aspect of daily life in the city. Demand has been growing considerably over the past ten years, at an average rate of 12% per year, with two thirds of the electricity generated consumed in Khartoum.[9] In addition to the lack of finance, the restructuring of the National Electricity Corporation (NEC) in 2010 has deteriorated the sector's performance.
There was an expectation for better management efficiency after the electricity corporation split into five separate companies based on their technical functions in 2010, but ultimately failed to show improvements. According to a World Bank report,[10] these different companies lack financial autonomy as annual budgets are determined by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MoFEP), while planning and investment decisions are taken by the Ministry of Water Resources, Irrigation and Energy (now Ministry of Oil and Energy), and the Sudanese Electricity Holding Company, with significant overlap of mandates. Therefore, as mentioned in the report, the sector has fallen prey to “a dilution of responsibility and accountability, unpredictability of decisions, and a decreased level of commitment in technical departments.”[11] This diagnosis, however, puts into question the soundness of governance reforms that promotes corporatisation[12] of public utility companies which are frequently prescribed by the World Bank as well as national and international development agencies.
More drastic versions of these neo-liberal reforms were passed after the overthrow of the government of Al Bashir following the December 2018 revolution. With an economic downturn experienced by the country since 2011, urgent solutions were needed for the financial deficits plaguing the public coffers due to long standing debt arrears, 30 years of corruption and clientelism by the authoritarian state. Requesting financial aid from the international community meant the submission of the transitional government to the typical recipes of liberalisation dictated as conditions for aid from international organisations and development agencies.
Key areas of these liberal reforms involved floating the currency, successive waves of removal of subsidies for fuel and bread, and partial lifting of the subsidy on electricity.[13] Even though the conditioned financial aid was suspended following the military coup in October 2021,[14] the coup leaders accelerated the liberal reforms to compensate for the lost foreign aid. Ever since, the cost of living has skyrocketed and employees of the electricity companies have become victims of the sector’s own policies.
With two waves of tariff increase[15] in 2021 and 2022, some consumer segments saw their tariff increases by more than thirty-three times in the course of a two-year period. This has led to an exponential inflation with increasing household bills, prices of goods and services. Information campaigns that accompanied subsidy lifting initiatives emphasised the fact that the rich were the ones benefiting the most from these subsidies due to their higher consumption rates. However, electricity tariff reforms have disproportionately affected the working class, marginalised communities and the agriculture and industry sectors.[16]
The rising living cost has been contested by several labour mobilisations across both public and private sectors, with the electricity workers strike being the most disruptive. Employees of the Sudanese electricity sector went on strike on the 6th of September 2022.[17] Their core demand was the implementation of a salary structure that they have submitted to the Minister of Oil and Energy. The first wave of the strike followed days of heavy rains and endless incidents of electrical failure. The phased strike started by refraining from work in distribution offices and a 20% reduction in the capacity of Khartoum North power station.
In the absence of an elected representative body in the electricity sector, the “Electricity Workers Salary Committee” was the body created to represent the employees and spearhead the negotiations process. The committee included members from the different electricity companies and was issuing successive statements such as the following:
We warn that the dilapidated electricity network situation portends damage leading to the complete blackout and we hold the Minister responsible for everything that happens as we assured him in today’s meeting. We also apologise to the citizens for any harm done! No retreat, no compromise. Our strength in our unity.[18]
Seven days after the electricity workers went into negotiations with officials from the Ministry of Energy and Oil, the strike ended. The workers were promised the implementation of the salary structure they demanded. However, less than two weeks after the agreement was reached, the workers went back on strike following the release of an official statement with a salary structure different from the one promised.[19]
The second strike[20] was more serious; it included the gradual withdrawal from power generation facilities, and even the interruption of power supply to the presidential palace. The first generation plant to exit the service was “Khartoum North Thermal plant” which supplies a significant number of the capital’s neighbourhoods. The plant outage left some areas in total darkness for 36 hours. Houses with diesel generators and solar systems became like small energy kiosks with neighbours queuing to charge their devices or study for exams. Male residents stayed in the streets till late hours of the night. But even in such spontaneous acts of finding a momentary relief in neighbourhood streets, females were still excluded from public spaces because of the conservative culture of Khartoum which has become aggravated by the prevalent security risks following the economic crisis.
Experiencing the strike
In a rather anecdotal tone, the next sections trace different encounters within the city following the strike of the electricity sector employees. In addition to the depiction of the lived experiences of various groups during the interruption of electricity supply, the stories examine the power dynamics mediating these experiences.
Beyond the dire consequences of the electricity disruption, the timing of the strike which was in the rainy season in autumn, exposed the consequences of poor state support and infrastructure. The lack of holistic urban planning, new settlements built in historical areas of stormwater runoffs and ephemeral streams, coupled with the changing rain patterns, threaten the tripartite city every year.[21]
Except for the few drains on the main roads, water flows in all directions with every few metres levelled independently. Decaying paved roads are navigable only from memory andevery car driver becomes a little Google map of potholes. Drivers of mostly privately-owned public transport reckon that driving on such days cost them more than what they can earn, hence they end up leaving passengers stranded on the splashy roads. Usually, power goes off for safety reasons during the rain, but longer blackouts can occur due to failures of the poorly maintained grid infrastructure. Moreover, when it rains at night and the power goes off, there is simply no convenient way to sleep; one cannot be outside in the rain, but it is difficult to stay indoors with no fan or air conditioning.
My encounter with the blackout was on the first day of the first strike, and we had an electric failure at our house. It was raining the night before, the power went off shortly after the rain started drizzling. As we woke up in the morning, the power was still off. Since the rain had stopped and we saw other neighbouring areas with power, we thought it was only a power failure.
I drove to the office of the Sudanese Electricity Distribution Company (SEDC). The doors were semi-closed and a man stopped me to explain that they were on strike. On the phone, I informed my sister of the strike and indicated that the technical problems will not be resolved soon. She was furious, as her three children and herself had a sleepless night due to poor ventilation and inability to use the air conditioning. The rain made things worse because they could not use their balcony. Despite the exhaustion, she had to assist her asthmatic child in the morning. Frustrated, she advised me to “ask around” for an electrician familiar with the SEDC systems to fix the issue for a fee.
The first person that came to my mind was Mustafa,[22] my colleague who was a previous SEDC staff, whom I called to ask for help. Mustafa shared the details of Khalid, an emergency staff in our area. Khalid elaborated that his team had visited the substation despite the strike. But as technicians, they do not have access to the ring which is kept only by engineers, and unfortunately, no engineers were responding. By this time, my brother-in-law who lived eight hours ahead of our time zone was also partaking in the “ask around” mission. His cousin found a SEDC engineer with the ring key, and power was back in our house in less than one hour.
Business activities were equally vulnerable to the disruption. During the second wave of strike in September, our office blacked out for two successive days. The diesel generator was out of service and the battery-inverter system died a few hours into the power cut. On the second day, we decided to go home before noon since laptops were dead and the heat became unbearable.
Leaving the office to head home was another challenge - people were enraged and small gatherings transformed into road barricades in several areas around the capital. Lengthy blackouts led to growing frustration and impatience among Khartoum residents and the extended blackout that followed the strike has stopped daily life of many. Burri, the region where my office is located, was one of the protest hotspots with daily protests near the police recreational club. Since the main roads in the area were obstructed, I had to take inner roads towards Manshia Bridge which connects Khartoum city to the Eastern side of the Blue Nile.
On the other side of the bridge, the Eastern Juraif resistance committee was blocking almost halfway to the bridge exit ramp with a mix of pavement interlocking bricks, big stones from the sides of the streets and collapsing lamp poles. Big cars were able to cross over the pavement for a U-turn back to Khartoum. Smaller cars had to take a small exit through the dirt road bordering the Blue Nile banks, used by farmers and workers of the traditional brick kilns by the river.
Barricades were placed in different parts of the city and angry citizens were on the streets to protest or just to vent, bringing major roads and intersections to a halt. Few hours later, the power was back, and the Electricity Workers Salary Committee issued a statement lifting the strike as an agreement had been reached. While the full details of the agreement were not shared, the salary committee explained that the demanded salary structure was approved and would be put into effect within less than one year.[23]
Conclusion
In tracing the strike event of the power sector employees, this essay shows how blackouts resulting from workers actions are experienced by some groups of Khartoum’s residents. It provides a glimpse into the parallel progress of harsher neoliberal reforms along with emerging acts of resistance. The event could be viewed as a moment where a double pressure was exercised on the extractive state. On the one hand, from the sector employees who have been watching their salaries being swallowed by inflation. On the other, by the city residents whose demands for a more decent urban life and services are increasingly voiced.
The disruption of the electricity supply also highlights the extent to which “energopower” animates even the smallest details of the daily life of the city. And how this power can be reclaimed through the collective actions of those who manage the “nuts and bolts” of electricity supply, both literally and figuratively.
By mobilising the power of collective organisation to demand more decent wages, the electricity sector employees challenged the coup government, and undermined its capacity to govern using naked force and illegitimate control over the state apparatus, without conceding a larger share of the depleting state resources. Reactions to this disruptive action demonstrated the coexistence of the improvised “deal making”[24] strategies characteristic to contemporary urban Africa. The deals capitalise on the differential access to privileges with overlapping and persisting ethnic, geographic, gendered and class hierarchies. This contrasts to the emerging and more politicised actions carried out by city dwellers in their struggle for an inclusive and just urban life. It is exemplified in the open and defiant escalations that resistance committees are leading against the state and its failure to provide the basics of a decent city life.
Notes
[1] Von Antina Schnitzler, Democracy's Infrastructure: Techno-Politics and Protest after Apartheid (Princeton University Press, 2016).
[2] Dominic Boyer, “Energopower: An Introduction,” Anthropological Quarterly 87, no. 2 (2014): pp. 309-333, https://doi.org/10.1353/anq.2014.0020.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Schnitzler, Democracy’s infrastructure: techno-politics and protest after apartheid.
[5]“Sub-Saharan Africa Atlas,” UN-Habitat-Regional Office For Africa, 2020, accessed May 1, 2023, https://unhabitat.org/sites/default/files/2020/07/atlasroaf_v02_final-compressed.pdf.
[6] Enrico Ille and Griet Steel, “ Khartoum: City Scoping Study,” The African Cities Research Consortium, June 2021, https://www.african-cities.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/ACRC_Khartoum_City-Scoping-Study.pdf.
[7] “Sub-Saharan Africa Atlas,” UN-Habitat-Regional Office For Africa.
[8] Enrico Ille and Griet Steel, “Khartoum: City Scoping Study”.
[9] “From Subsidy to Sustainability: Diagnostic Review of Sudan’s Electricity Sector | Final Report,” World Bank, June 30, 2019, https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/486961588608080192/pdf/From-Subsidy-to-Sustainability-Diagnostic-Review-of-Sudan-Electricity-Sector.pdf.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Corporatization refers to the restructuring or transformation of a state-owned asset or organisation into a corporation. These organisations typically have a board of directors, management, and shareholders. However, unlike publicly traded companies, the government is the company's only shareholder, and the shares in the company are not publicly traded.
[13] “Reforms, Arrears Clearance Pave the Way for Sudan's Full Reengagement with the World Bank Group,” World Bank, April 1, 2021, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2021/03/29/reforms-arrears-clearance-pave-the-way-for-sudan-s-full-reengagement-with-the-world-bank-group.
[14] “Sudan Coup: World Bank Suspends Aid after Military Takeover,” BBC News, October 28, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-59066654.
[15] “Al Sudān yodāìf ta`rifat al-kahrubā’ arba` marrāt” [Sudan Will Quadruple the Electricity Tariff,] Anadolu Agency, January 1, 2021, https://www.aa.com.tr/ar/اقتصاد/السودان-يضاعف-تعرفة-الكهرباء-4-مرات/2095710; “tafāsyl al-as`ār al jadyda lil kahrobā’ fil Sudan bidāyatan min 24 yanāyir 2022” [Details of the New Electricity Prices in Sudan Starting from 24 January 2022,] Open Sudan, January 25, 2022, https://opensudan.net/archives/22037.
[16] Razaz H Basheir and Mohamed Salah Abdelrahman, “The Electricity Crisis in Sudan,” Transnational Institute, July 19, 2022, https://www.tni.org/en/article/the-electricity-crisis-in-sudan.
[17] Dabanga, “Employees from Sudan's Electricity Sector Begin Strike,” Dabanga Radio TV Online, October 17, 2022, https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/employees-from-sudan-s-electricity-sector-begin-strike.
[18] “Electricity Workers in Khartoum Occupy Control Room and Cut Power as Pay Strike Escalates,” MENA Solidarity Network, September 8, 2022, https://menasolidaritynetwork.com/2022/09/07/electricity-workers-in-khartoum-occupy-control-room-and-cut-power-as-pay-strike-escalates/.
[19] “Al-kahrubā’ tuwadih haqyqat idafit ruswm jadyda ilā fātwratiha” [Electricity Company Explains the Fact of Adding New Electricity Fees,] Ultra Sudan, accessed April 30, 2023, "الكهرباء" توضح حقيقة إضافة رسوم جديدة إلى فاتورتها (ultrasawt.com).
[20] Razaz H Basheir and Mohamed Salah Abdelrahman, “The Electricity Crisis in Sudan”.
[21] Andrea Zerboni et al., “The Khartoum-Omdurman Conurbation: A Growing Megacity at the Confluence of the Blue and White Nile Rivers,” Journal of Maps 17, no. 4 (2020): 227-240, https://doi.org/10.1080/17445647.2020.1758810.
[22] Pseudonyms are used here.
[23] “Sudan Strikes over Unpaid Wages and 2022 Salaries Continue,” Dabanga Radio TV Online, October 17, 2022, https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/sudan-strikes-over-unpaid-wages-and-2022-salaries-continue.
[24] AbdouMaliq Simone, “Too Many Things to Do: Social Dimensions of City-Making in Africa,” in The Arts of Citizenship in African Cities Infrastructures and Spaces of Belonging, ed. M. Diouf and R. Fredericks (New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2014), pp. 25-47.
Author
Razaz H. Basheir is a researcher focusing on questions of urban infrastructure in general and energy infrastructure in particular. Currently, Razaz is a Phd candidate at the African Center for Cities-University of Cape Town and a researcher at ISTinaD (Innovation, Science and Technology Think Tank for People-Centered Development) in Khartoum.
